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CHINA's CONCEPTION OF LAw FOR HONG KONG, AND ITS 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE SAR AND US-PRC RELATIONS 
A
s Hong Kong completes its first year as a Special Administrative 
Region of the People's Republic of China, the territory's long tran­
sition to a new relationship with China continues. The legal frame­
work for the SAR, and China's conception of that framework, have played 
- and still play - a central role in this process, and in shaping Hong 
Kong's prospects. The Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of 
Hong Kong, the Basic Law of the Hong Kong SAR, and China's interpre­
tation of those documents' status and meaning, were the principal foci of 
legal and political controversies in the 1980s, and became the key refer­
ents and touchstones for disputes over laws and institutions during the 
1990s. They may become even more prominent with the ending of 
Britain's roles in the territory 's governance, the fading of China's strong 
reversion-era imperative to remain in the background, and the passing of 
the drama of Hong Kong's reversion-focused legal and institutional con­
troversies. 
China's approach to Hong Kong's reversion has implications for US­
PRC relations. Narrowly, the US has largely succeeded the United King­
dom as the principal external guardian of the legal promises of autonomy 
and continuity for post-reversion Hong Kong, and thus made Hong Kong 
an important factor in US-China relations. More broadly, China's con­
ception of the arrangements for Hong Kong suggests features of China's 
approaches to law and sovereignty- at home, abroad and beyond Hong 
Kong- which America's China policy must address. 
For China, the "Hong Kong question" has been a matter of sover­
eignty - of reclaiming and delineating the authority to make laws for, 
and to govern, the people and territory of Hong Kong. China has consis­
tently approached this project from a perspective that is natural law-like 
in its idea of sovereignty at international law and positivist in its notion of 
sovereignty in the domestic realm. On this view, there are fixed principles 
of what it means to be a sovereign - and, specifically, what it means to 
sovereign China- as a matter of international law. These principles in­
clude the Chinese sovereign's plenary authority to rule all areas and people 
that are non-derogably part of an almost noumenal China- one that 
includes Hong Kong. Although many international agreements are ac­
ceptable from this "naturalist" perspective, any agreement that claims to 
remove Hong Kong (or any other part of China) from Chinese sover­
eignty, or that purports to restrict China's sovereign discretion in ruling 
such territory and people, is illegitimate. It is not to be acc.epted in the 
first place, and may be rejected later as a legal nullity or, at least, not nor­
matively binding. 
This view is amply reflected in the 1984 UK-PRC agreement that pro­
vides for the transfer of authority over Hong Kong and sketches the legal 
arrangements for implementing post-reversion policies of"one country, two 
systems:'"a high degree of autonomy," and "Hong Kong people ruling Hong 
Kong:' The Joint Declaration's opening article formally stakes out China's 
position on the international legal question: "The Government of the People's 
Republic of China declares .... that it has decided to resume the exercise of 
sovereignty over Hong Kong'' effective from July 1, 1997. China thus asserts 
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that the Sino-British accord does not, and cannot, transfer 
sovereignty over Hong Kong because Hong Kong has al­
ways been China's, notwithstanding the nineteenth-century 
treaties purporting to cede sovereignty permanently over 
Hong Kong Island and Kowloon, and to divide sovereignty 
temporally over the New Territories. As Chinese leaders 
and negotiators stressed throughout the talks leading to the 
Joint Declaration, the June 30, 1997 expiration date of the 
ninety-nine-year lease on the New Territories was a date of 
convenience only. Because sovereignty has always resided 
with China, China has always been free to resume the exer­
cise of sovereignty over all of Hong Kong earlier - or later 
- if it judged that "conditions were ripe." This determi­
nation to avoid any appearance of accepting the nineteenth­
century treaties' validity - and thus the need for a new 
treaty to reconvey sovereignty- also surfaced in China's 
insistence that the accord is not a treaty. The joint declara­
tion format, China's foreign minister explained, is a "fairly 
special technique" that provides an "appropriate form" for 
addressing Hong Kong's return. 
Other provisions of the Joint Declaration reflect ad­
ditional aspects of China's claim to inalienable and indi­
visible sovereignty over Hong Kong. Article 3 states, "The 
Government of the People's Republic of China declares 
that the basic policies of the People's Republic of China re­
garding Hong Kong'' are the promises of continuity, au­
tonomy, and protection of rights outlined in the remain­
der of the article. A fuller description of those pledges is 
consigned to an Annex which, although declared an inte­
gral part of the Joint Declaration, is cast as China's 
"elaborat[ion]" of its policies toward Hong Kong, which 
are to be implemented through PRC legislation. The per­
spective underlying these provisions is that the declara­
tions of "basic policies" are binding not as treaty-like 
promises to the UK, but as self-imposed limits of the Chi­
nese sovereign. (Indeed, they had received their initial 
public formulation before formal Sino-British negotia­
tions began, in Deng Xiaoping's unilateral pronouncement 
to Hong Kong's governor that "we will treat Hong Kong 
as a special region." ) The Chinese "naturalist" claim here 
is two-fold: First, because 
there is, and can be, no 
quo of China's regaining 
its undisturbed and non­
derogable sovereignty 
over Hong Kong, there is 
and can be no quid in the 
PRC's statement of its 
plans for Hong Kong. 
Second, the statements 
about how China will ex­
ercise sovereignty over 
Hong Kong cannot im­
pose irrevocable restric­
tions (especially ones giv­
ing a foreign power en-
- 22 -
forcement rights) because that would be an attempt to 
"carve up" sovereignty over Hong Kong, much as the nine­
teenth-century treaties had purported to do. That the PRC 
would find any such arrangement unthinkable has been 
clear at least since Beijing's rebuff of the UK's initial pro­
posal to address the 1997 question by recognizing Chi­
nese sovereignty while continuing British administration, 
and since Deng Xiaoping's declaration that he would not 
be another Li Hongzhang- the Qing dynasty official ir­
redeemably tainted by his role in ceding part ofHong Kong 
to Britain. 
This PRC approach has squarely rejected a very dif­
ferent British perspective. The UK's conception of the 
Joint Declaration, the nineteenth-century treaties and the 
�nternational legal question of sovereignty over Hong 
Kong has been strongly positivist: Sovereigns are free to 
make agreements addressing any number of issues, includ­
ing the reassignment of sovereignty or restrictions on its 
exercise, so long as minimal requirements of sovereign 
capacity and contract law-like formalities are satisfied·. On 
this view, the nineteenth-century treaties lawfully trans­
ferred sovereignty over Hong Kong Island and Kowloon 
to Britain in perpetuity and sovereignty (or at least the 
exercise of sovereignty) over the New Territories for 
ninety-nine years. Indeed, it was the very validity of those 
treaties that created a "Hong Kong problem" because, ab­
sent further action, the right to exercise sovereign author­
ity over the vast bulk of the colony would revert to China 
on July 1, 1997 while Britain would remain sovereign over 
the remainder - a situation that the British considered 
unworkable. A new accord of equal dignity was necessary 
and appropriate to address the problems the old treaties 
had created. 
This British conception of the situation is formally 
stated in article 2 of the Joint Declaration, which provides: 
"The Government of the United Kingdom ... declares 
that it will restore Hong Kong to the People's Republic of 
China;' effective 1 July 1997. This view that the Joint Dec­
laration transfers sovereignty, reversing the nineteenth­
century cessions, was underscored in Prime Minister 
Thatcher's initial- and 
impolitic - assertion 
that China's recognition 
of the validity of the 
original treaties was a 
precondition to negotia­
tions over the territory 's 
future, in the Foreign 
Secretary's description of 
the Joint Declaration as "a 
treaty in the most solemn 
form," and in Britain's 
insistence that the docu­
ment be registered in the 
United Nations treaty se­
ries. From this positivist, 
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contractarian perspective, the provisions setting forth the 
PRC's basic policies regarding post-reversion Hong Kong 
are appropriate considerations for Britain's relinquishing 
sovereignty, and the limits they impose on China are no 
more problematic than the partial "unbundling" of the 
"sticks" of sovereignty that are commonplace in the Brit­
ish Commonwealth and the European Union. The UK's 
embrace of this position has been clear from a senior 
negotiator's early comment that it was important that 
China's promises be put in "lawyer's language:' to British 
officials' repeated and continuing declarations that Brit­
ain has a right to insist that Beijing fulfill the commit­
ments toward Hong Kong set forth in the Joint Declara­
tion. 
While the PRC's naturalist views on the international 
legal question of sovereignty over Hong Kong have 
emerged partly in response to the UK's positivist perspec­
(One notorious example is the rhetorical question Deng 
posed in 1984: "How can Hong Kong be described as Chi­
nese territory if we don't have the right to station troops 
there?") 
China's naturalist position on the international legal 
issue of sovereignty over Hong Kong has also been part of 
a broad and coherent- if Janus-faced - vision of the 
"sovereign empowered:' China's international legal claim 
to non -derogable and indivisible sovereignty over Chinese 
territory and people provides a principled argument for 
shielding the sovereign's domestic actions from the risks 
of lawful treaty-like obligations. Such a position fits com­
fortably with - indeed, seems to suggest- a claim that 
the sovereign acts with plenary law-making and govern­
mental authority at home, free from non-procedural con­
straints and immune from substantive challenges. 
This PRC view of the nature of domestic authority 
tive, the PRC's arguments 
cannot be dismissed as 
mere negotiating tactics. 
The PRC's position has 
roots and resonances well 
beyond the last few de­
cades of the Hong Kong 
question. Since well be­
fore the establishment of 
the People's Republic, 
China has denounced the 
treaties ceding Hong 
Kong, and many other 
agreements granting ex­
traterritorial rights to for­
eign powers, as "unequal 
treaties" that are invalid 
primarily on naturalist 
gt'Ounds. Going beyond 
China's international /ega/ claim 
to non-derogable and indivisible 
sovereignty over Chinese 
territory and people provides 
over Hong Kong has been 
positivist, and radically so. 
Its core claim is that laws 
for any part of China are 
exercises of discretionary 
sovereign authority, and 
are binding so long as they 
satisfy formal require­
ments of enactment by 
authorized institutions 
and according to proper 
procedures. Such laws can 
be altered, and institutions 
restructured, by acts of the 
sovereign that meet these 
same tests. Within those 
limits, the sovereign may 
give the laws whatever 
a principled [if self-serving] 
argument for shiel ding the 
sovereign's domestic actions 
from the risks of lawful 
treaty-like obligations. 
contract law-like notions similar to duress or unconscio­
nability, the long-standing Chinese indictment has as­
serted that the treaties impermissibly granted foreign pow­
ers so much while granting China too little in return, re­
fused to recognize China as an equal sovereign, and tried 
to divide China's sovereignty (along territorial, temporal 
and other jurisdictional lines). Moreover, the PRC has 
stuck to its naturalist position on sovereignty at interna­
tional law even when it seems not to have been the only, 
or best, way to serve its aim of recovering Hong Kong. In 
1973, the PRC refused the UN Special Committee on 
Colonialism's help in claiming a right to the territory (al­
beit one China might not want to exercise promptly), de­
claring that Hong Kong was an internal matter "within 
China's sovereign right" that the UN had "no right to dis­
cuss." During the Joint Declaration negotiations and af­
ter, Chinese leaders were willing to rattle confidence in 
Hong Kong and derail Sino-British cooperation through 
statements that, at base, were demands that the PRC's 
position on sovereignty at international law be accepted. 
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substance, and institu­
tions whatever structure, it deems prudent. 
This conception of domestic sovereignty pervades the 
Basic Law - the elaborate framework legislation that 
spells out the structures, powers and methods for select­
ing the membership for the executive, legislative and ju­
dicial institutions charged with exercising the SAR's "high 
degree of autonomy:' the substance of the pledges of con­
tinuity in Hong Kong's economic, legal and social systems, 
and the controversial mechanisms for amending and in­
terpreting the Basic Law and accepting or overturning new 
and preexisting Hong Kong laws. Viewed from Beijing, 
the Basic Law is a mere statute, the basis of its legitimacy 
not qualitatively different from that of other positivistically 
valid exercises of the Chinese sovereign's legislative power. 
Broadly, the Basic Law is the product of a proper exercise 
of the general legislative powers that the PRC's constitu­
tion confers upon the National People's Congress, in this 
case by enacting a bill prepared by a legislatively-created 
and PRC-dominated Basic Law Drafting Committee. 
More narrowly, the Basic Law reflects the NPC's exercise 
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I 
June, 1997: Striking the Colors in the dusk of British rule. 
of the authority carefully provided in an article added to 
the PRC's 1982 constitution, which empowers the legisla-
ture to create special administrative regions on occasions 
and with powers and privileges determined by the NPC. 
During the drafting process, Chinese officials' pointed re-
jection of Hong Kong references to the Basic Law as a 
"mini-constitution" for the region (and one that Hong 
Kong's legislature might debate and reject) reflected and 
underscored China's position that the Basic Law is noth-
ing more - and nothing less - than a piece of national 
PRC legislation.1 
Moreover, the Basic Law implements a strongly posi­
tivist vision of the Chinese sovereign's domestic author­
ity with respect to Hong Kong. The general principles 
section explains that the NPC authorizes- essentially as 
an act of unilateral and revocable delegation -the SAR 
to exercise a high degree of autonomy in governmental 
affairs. The same idea runs through the Basic Law's many 
institution-creating, power-conferring and rights-defin­
ing articles, as well as the provisions governing the recep­
tion of prior Hong Kong law and the continuity of the 
legal system. Several provisions retain a vital core of dis­
cretionary sovereign power in the hands of the central 
authorities, avoiding the alienation of ultimate authority 
that is anathema to both the domestic and international 
legal dimensions of the PRC vision of the sovereign em­
powered. Key sections assign to the NPC or its Standing 
Committee powers to amend the Basic Law, to interpret 
1 Within the framework of the PRC's positivist legislative theory and its 
naturalist perspective on the international legal status of Hong Kong, 
the Basic Law's purported mechanisms of"entrenchment"- its desig­
nation as a "basic law:' its nominal prohibition of amendments incon­
sistent with the PRC's expressed basic policies, and its status as an 
instrument implementing promises sketched in the Joint Declaration 
- cannot substantially constrain China's sovereign discretion. 
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the Basic Law (and to bind Hong Kong courts 
with interpretation of provisions concerning 
central government-SAR relations), and to 
reject laws passed by the SAR legislature, or 
preexisting Hong Kong laws, on the grounds 
that they contravene the Basic Law. 
The same perspective has characterized 
the positions taken by China, and "pro-PRC" 
groups in Hong Kong, in the controversies 
over specific SAR laws and institutions that 
have dominated Hong Kong politics during 
the 1990s. After the violent suppression of 
the protests at Beijing's Tiananmen Square, 
Hong Kong's colonial government adopted 
a Bill of Rights Ordinance that tracked the 
major UN covenant and established prin­
ciples of statutory construction and mecha­
nisms of judicial review to ensure that Hong 
Kong's laws were brought into conformity 
with the Ordinance. The PRC and its allies 
denounced the Bill of Rights and related leg­
islative changes with a grab-bag of positivist arguments: 
The Basic Law provision authorizing continuation of the 
"laws previously in force" in Hong Kong did not autho­
rize the survival of radical changes wrought by the 
Ordinance's substantive provisions, or the new category 
of near-constitutional law created by provisions directing 
courts to interpret laws to be consistent with the Ordi­
nance where possible, and to rule them unlawful where 
not. Moves to liberalize civil liberties-restricting legisla­
tion were a British plot to undermine the power and dis­
cretion of Hong Kong's government on the eve of rever­
sion. The Ordinance's substantive provisions were super­
fluous because, through Basic Law articles that track in­
ternational human rights standards and pledge that local 
laws will continue in force the requirements of the UN 
covenants, China has already done all that is necessary, 
and possible, to provide legal guarantees for such rights. 
And moves by PRC and SAR legislative bodies to over­
turn and replace objectionable provisions at the moment 
of reversion were proper, lawful exercises of China's sov­
ereign power. 
The PRC response to Governor Patten's post­
Tiananmen introduction of more democratic rules for 
electing Hong Kong's last colonial legislature met with 
similar responses: Broadening the so-called "functional 
constituencies" so that nearly every Hong Konger with a 
job could vote for a representative of his economic sector 
(as well as for a representative of his geographic district) 
was a move that "perfidiously disregarded" the Basic Law 
- "a dignified document" that was to be "strictly ob­
served" and that contemplated only the narrow elector­
ates of company heads, elite professionals and pro-China 
unions that had comprised functional constituencies in 
prior elections. Because Patten's reforms thus contra­
vened the Basic Law's requirements for electing a transi-
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tional legislature, the members of the last colonial legisla­
ture would not be appointed en masse as members of the 
first SAR legislature, and the "through train" was neces­
sarily and lawfully derailed. The PRC-established Prepa­
ratory Committee could lawfully arrange the appointment 
of a Provisional Legislature, to take office at reversion, 
because the Basic Law did not prohibit it, because the NPC 
had authorized the Preparatory Committee to do every­
thing necessary to set up the SAR, and because the NPC's 
approval of the Preparatory Committee's final report ef­
fectively authorized, ex post, the Committee's actions. 
Post-reversion moves to adopt a narrow franchise for func­
tional constituencies and a proportional representation 
system for geographic constituencies in the 1998legisla­
tive elections were proper exercises of legislative author­
ity that China delegated to the SAR, and reflect a permis­
sible choice among several potential arrangements com­
patible with the Basic Law's requirements for constitut­
ing the legislature by elections. 
China and its Hong Kong allies have also made pri­
discretion. 
On these issues of domestic law and institutions for 
the SAR, the PRC's approach has confronted a radically 
different view advanced by the British authorities and lib­
erals and "pro-democracy" groups in Hong Kong. This 
latter perspective on domestic sovereignty for Hong Kong 
has been broadly natural law-like and specifically liberal­
democratic: Laws and government institutions for the 
SAR must satisfy fixed, independently discoverable norms 
- generally ones compatible with liberalism, democracy 
and the rule of law- that define the order that a sover­
eign is obliged to secure for its subjects. Laws and institu­
tions that fail to measure up- a category that, Hong Kong 
democrats and independents stressed, included much of 
the legislation and constitutional structure of colonial 
Hong Kong- may be sources of legal obligation, but are 
nonetheless defective and properly denounced, even if they 
enjoy impeccable positivist pedigrees. 
On this view, the Basic Law and other laws for the 
SAR have offered means to fulfill what Thatcher termed 
marily positivist argu­
ments in defending laws 
that permitted a lower­
than-expected number 
of foreign judges on the 
Court of Final Appeal 
and limited SAR courts' 
authority to hear cases 
against the government 
and state-controlled en­
tities: The arrangement 
for the CPA provides for 
four permanent judges 
and a list from which one 
temporary judge can be 
drawn. This arrange­
ment theoretically leaves 
open the possibility of as 
many as four foreign 
judges (or as few as 
none) on the bench, and 
Kunming policemen: the other system in "One Country, Two Systems." 
Britain's "moral respon­
sibility and duty" toward 
the people of Hong 
Kong, and to bring Hong 
Kong's illiberal and un­
democratic colonial laws 
into line with what many 
of Hong Kong's emer­
gent politicians have re­
garded as requirements 
of just and proper gov­
ernance. For many of the 
territory's liberals and 
democrats, the Basic Law 
is, or ought to be, a con­
stitution for Hong Kong 
- not merely in the 
structural sense of a 
document that cannot be 
amended by ordinary 
legislation, but also in the 
is fully compatible with the Basic Law (and the Joint Dec­
laration) provisions allowing jurists from other common 
law jurisdictions to be invited "as required." Indeed, the 
PRC has been extremely generous, and accommodating 
of Hong Kong's interests, in allowing any non-citizens to 
wield such significant sovereign authority over a part of 
China. The exclusion of"acts of state such as foreign af­
fairs and defense" from the courts' jurisdiction and the 
post-reversion extension of immunity to controversial 
PRC entities (such as the Xinhua News Agency, Beijing's 
principal outpost in pre-reversion Hong Kong) from cer­
tain Hong Kong laws (apparently including an ordinance 
resembling some features of the US's freedom of infor­
mation act) are either technical changes incidental to re­
version or matters unquestionably within the sovereign's 
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sense of a charter that declares and secures the liberal, 
democratic and rule-of-law values that are the hallmarks 
of legitimate rule. Thus, during the drafting process, crit­
ics attacked proposed provisions for requiring the SAR to 
enact laws to prohibit subversion and foreign political ties, 
for commingling judicial and political authority in the 
NPC Standing Committee, and for appearing to replace 
the principled and transcendent common law foundations 
of Hong Kong laws with rigid and narrow positivist statu­
tory underpinnings. 
In the controversies of the final pre-reversion ye�s 
and the early post-reversion period, many of the argu­
ments from the British and from Hong Kong's liberal and 
pro-democracy politicians have continued in this broadly 
naturalist vein: The Bill of Rights was necessary to fulfill 
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the sovereign's obligation to subjects whose 
confidence was deeply and justifiably shaken 
by the Tiananmen Incident, and to erase illib­
eral laws-on-the-books that had become little­
used in Hong Kong's generally liberal law-in­
practice. Post-reversion roll-backs of late-co­
lonial changes to civil liberties laws unaccept­
ably threatened "important universal values." 
Patten's reforms, rival proposals for more 
sweeping democratization, the derailing of the 
through train, the establishment of the Provi­
sional Legislature, and the enactment of laws 
governing the elections for the first SAR legis­
lature are praiseworthy or condemnable to the 
extent that they establish a democratic and ac­
countable government, and provide institu­
tional foundations for economic and political 
liberties and the rule of law. Laws governing the number 
of foreign judges on the CFA and the jurisdiction of SAR 
courts are defensible or unacceptable to the degree that 
they provide, or fail to provide, institutions independent 
and powerful enough to insure the rule of law and gov­
ernment under law. 
Although the PRC's perspective on domestic laws and 
institutions for the SAR has developed partly to �ddress 
these British and Hong Kong liberal-democratic argu­
ments, the PRC's approach has not been simply instru­
mental or narrowly case-specific. The approach to law­
making for the PRC has been predominantly positivist, 
especially during the post-Mao decades. In theory, legis­
lation may be constrained by fixed socialist principles or 
iron laws of economics, but China's reform -era law-mak­
ing has been driven primarily by a pragmatism and an 
experimentalism that are more congenial to positivism. 
This approach has produced numerous "draft" and "pro­
visional" laws, much legislation for trial or local imple­
mentation, and massive revision or supersession of re­
cently adopted major statutes. This perspective also has 
regarded claims that specific laws are economically un­
wise or ideologically suspect as arguments for revising 
them through proper procedures, not for disregarding 
them by appealing to assertedly transcendent, extralegal 
norms, in a manner all too evocative of the Cultural Revo­
lution. 
Moreover, the PRC's insistence on positivist principles 
in the controversies over laws for the SAR has been so thor­
oughgoing that Beijing has often risked serious discon­
tent and costly uncertainty in Hong Kong to make clear 
its position that political and economic rights and judi­
cial and representative institutions that many Hong 
Kongers value are ultimately the products of discretion­
ary exercises of China's sovereign power. Strikingly ab­
sent, for example, is any serious attempt to ground prom­
ises of continuity in Hong Kong's economic and social 
systems in the non-positivist arguments (about the need 
for a very long transition to socialism) that have been of-
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fered to justify capitalist-style laws in the mainland. Fi­
nally, China's positivist conception of domestic sovereignty 
is symbiotic with its naturalist notion of sovereignty at 
international law. It suggests or demands a view of 
sovereignty's external face that protects the sovereign from 
compromising abroad the discretion and power that posi­
tivist principles secure to the sovereign at home. 
Properly understood, the PRC's approach to law, sov­
ereignty and the Hong Kong question offers both hopeful 
and cautionary lessons about the prospects for the SAR 
and for US-PRC relations (in which Hong Kong is a sig­
nificant issue). First, China's notions of law and sover­
eignty have left room for some accords with partners or 
antagonists who have proceeded from radically different 
perspectives. Especially as the controversies in Hong Kong 
have turned to concrete legal and institutional questions 
(such as the composition or establishment date of the CFA, 
or the structure of representative districts and functional 
constituencies for legislative elections), particular visions 
of sovereignty have not provided dear, determinate an­
swers. There has been considerable scope for the PRC to 
win support or acquiescence for outcomes it has favored, 
and to accept - even if only for prudential reasons -
some legal changes introduced in late colonial Hong Kong. 
Prospects for finding additional zones of agreement seem 
promising in SAR controversies and in Sino-American re­
lations, given that increasingly important actors and align­
ments in Hong Kong politics (including politically engaged 
business leaders and a possibly emergent populist coali­
tion) and the US (which is neither a party to the Joint 
Declaration nor the territory's former colonial ruler) are, 
by temperament and experience, not deeply committed 
to the view of law and sovereignty that the UK and Hong 
Kong's most ardent liberals and democrats embraced and 
that the PRC has strongly opposed. Nonetheless, many 
apparent accords will be more fragile than they seem. Just 
beneath surface agreements, fault lines separate China's 
perspective on law and sovereignty over Hong Kong from 
the perspectives that hold sway among the SAR's pro-de-
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mocracy politicians, who still command great popular 
support in Hong Kong, and the US, which has linked US­
PRC relations to matters that China considers within its 
own sovereign discretion (including Beijing's implemen­
tation of the Joint Declaration, and human rights condi­
tions in Hong Kong and elsewhere in China). 
Second, the perspective that has characterized China's 
arguments about sovereignty over Hong Kong_indicates 
an additional dimension of an approach to legal and po­
litical issues in the PRC's foreign relations that is highly 
complex, but arguably stable, coherent and, to a degree, 
principled. China's handling of the Hong Kong question 
thus suggests the need to supplement a conventional wis­
dom that regards China's approach to sources of interna­
tional legal obligation as largely positivist (a position com­
patible with China's protective, naturalist view of sover­
eignty at international law) and that stresses the continu­
ing importance of fixed ideological or quasi-scientific prin­
ciples in PRC domestic law (despite China's positivist un­
derstanding of the laws that "ought," as a prudential and 
political matter, to align with such principles). With China's 
approach to the outside world and to internal affairs that 
have been a concern for the US and other countries with 
significant human rights or pro-democracy components 
in their foreign relations laws and policies perceived in 
this way, prospects seem relatively bright for proposed 
agreements that are crafted with a sense of which elements 
in China's repertoire of ideas about law and sovereignty are 
most likely to be implicated. On the other hand, attempts 
to win China's acceptance of positions that conflict with 
core elements of China's notion of sovereignty will be ex­
traordinarily difficult to obtain, even with side-payments 
or concessions on other issues that would seem sufficient 
to induce compliance in a narrowly interest-based model 
of China's behavior. 
Finally, China's adherence to the particular concep­
tion of sovereignty reflected in its positions in the highly 
public debates over law for Hong Kong has not meant that 
fidelity to a vision trumps the PRC's interests. It indicates 
only that principles which are compatible with the PRC's 
overarching interests, and which usually track its imme­
diate interests, can affect perceptions of those interests at 
the margin, and encourage behavior that does not rigidly 
follow simple calculations of marginal gains or losses of 
wealth or power. To the considerable extent that a pros­
perous and stable Hong Kong and a stable relationship 
with the US are in the PRe's interest, China's conceptions 
of sovereignty and other legal and political principles are 
unlikely to pose insurmountable barriers to cooperation, 
and agreements need not unravel if they exact some sac­
rifices of immediate interests. But this mixing and meld­
ing of interests and principles also makes for a complex 
environment for negotiations concerning Hong Kong or 
US-China relations. It suggests that seemingly promising 
appeals to the PRC's interests may fail and China's seem­
ingly plausible invocations of principle sometimes will be 
disingenuous posturing or bargaining tactics that the US 
and Hong Kong liberals and democrats will want to dis­
count. •:• 
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